Coalition formation in games of fair division

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)90105-8zbMath0802.90134OpenAlexW2046063199MaRDI QIDQ1327964

Yoshikatsu Tatamitani

Publication date: 3 July 1994

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)90105-8

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsmoneymanipulation gameenvy-free allocationssingle indivisible good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
• The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods

This page was built for publication: Coalition formation in games of fair division