The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible

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Publication:2366195

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(93)90047-MzbMath0780.90027OpenAlexW1965964088WikidataQ59972953 ScholiaQ59972953MaRDI QIDQ2366195

William Thomson, Koichi Tadenuma

Publication date: 29 June 1993

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(93)90047-m




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