An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
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Publication:6074887
DOI10.1111/IJET.12300zbMATH Open1530.91240OpenAlexW3150207408WikidataQ114973784 ScholiaQ114973784MaRDI QIDQ6074887FDOQ6074887
Authors: Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers 
Publication date: 19 October 2023
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12300
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