Room assignment-rent division: a market approach
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Publication:1884639
DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0231-0zbMath1101.91025OpenAlexW3021604157MaRDI QIDQ1884639
M. Utku Ünver, Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Tayfun Sönmez
Publication date: 5 November 2004
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0231-0
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