Room assignment-rent division: a market approach
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Publication:1884639
DOI10.7916/D8S18DPG 10.1007/s00355-003-0231-0; 10.7916/D8S18DPGzbMath1101.91025MaRDI QIDQ1884639
M. Utku Ünver, Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Tayfun Sönmez
Publication date: 5 November 2004
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0231-0
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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