Generalized rental harmony

DOI10.1080/00029890.2022.2037988zbMATH Open1490.91117arXiv1912.13249OpenAlexW3006844047MaRDI QIDQ5075869FDOQ5075869

Publication date: 12 May 2022

Published in: The American Mathematical Monthly (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Rental Harmony is the problem of assigning rooms in a rented house to tenants with different preferences, and simultaneously splitting the rent among them, such that no tenant envies the bundle (room+price) given to another tenant. Different papers have studied this problem under two incompatible assumptions: the miserly tenants assumption is that each tenant prefers a free room to a non-free room; the quasilinear tenants assumption is that each tenant attributes a monetary value to each room, and prefers a room of which the difference between value and price is maximum. This note shows how to adapt the main technique used for rental harmony with miserly tenants, using Sperner's lemma, to a much more general class of preferences, that contains both miserly and quasilinear tenants as special cases. This implies that some recent results derived for miserly tenants apply to this more general preference class too.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.13249

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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