Generalized rental harmony

DOI10.1080/00029890.2022.2037988MaRDI QIDQ5075869zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Erel Segal-Halevi

Publication date 12 May 2022

Published in The American Mathematical Monthly (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.13249

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Abstract: Rental Harmony is the problem of assigning rooms in a rented house to tenants with different preferences, and simultaneously splitting the rent among them, such that no tenant envies the bundle (room+price) given to another tenant. Different papers have studied this problem under two incompatible assumptions: the miserly tenants assumption is that each tenant prefers a free room to a non-free room; the quasilinear tenants assumption is that each tenant attributes a monetary value to each room, and prefers a room of which the difference between value and price is maximum. This note shows how to adapt the main technique used for rental harmony with miserly tenants, using Sperner's lemma, to a much more general class of preferences, that contains both miserly and quasilinear tenants as special cases. This implies that some recent results derived for miserly tenants apply to this more general preference class too.

Recommendations

• Rental harmony with roommates
• Achieving rental harmony with a secretive roommate
• Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division
• Which is the fairest (rent division) of them all?
• Room assignment-rent division: a market approach

Cites work

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Cited in

(4)

• Achieving rental harmony with a secretive roommate
• Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
• Rental harmony with roommates
• Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division

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