Bidding for envy-freeness: a procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems
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Publication:2567945
DOI10.1007/S003550100149zbMATH Open1072.91590DBLPjournals/scw/HaakeRS02OpenAlexW2134776949WikidataQ59567287 ScholiaQ59567287MaRDI QIDQ2567945FDOQ2567945
Authors: Claus-Jochen Haake, Francis Edward Su, Matthias G. Raith 
Publication date: 14 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100149
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