The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections

DOI10.1007/S11238-013-9383-2MaRDI QIDQ483636zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Clark Bowman, Jonathan K. Hodge, Ada Yu

Publication date 17 December 2014

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9383-2

zbMATH Keywords

game theorylearningseparabilitycomputer simulationiterative votingreferendum elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1424768 (Why is no real title available?)
• Anscombe's paradox and the rule of three-fourths
• Avoiding Anscombe's paradox
• Bidding for envy-freeness: a procedural approach to \(n\)-player fair-division problems
• Classifying interdependence in multidimensional binary preferences
• Coalition formation games with separable preferences.
• Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
• How does separability affect the desirability of referendum election outcomes?
• Permutations of separable preference orders
• Preseparable extensions of multidimensional preferences
• The Mathematics of Voting and Elections: A Hands-On Approach
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Voting paradoxes and referenda
• Weighted congestion games with separable preferences

Cited in

(5)

• The mathematics of referendum elections and separable preferences
• Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• How does separability affect the desirability of referendum election outcomes?
• Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting

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