The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections

DOI10.1007/S11238-013-9383-2zbMATH Open1304.91074OpenAlexW1998230308MaRDI QIDQ483636FDOQ483636

Authors: Clark Bowman, Jonathan K. Hodge, Ada Yu 

Publication date: 17 December 2014

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9383-2

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zbMATH Keywords

game theorylearningseparabilitycomputer simulationiterative votingreferendum elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Anscombe's paradox and the rule of three-fourths
• Voting paradoxes and referenda
• Avoiding Anscombe's paradox
• How does separability affect the desirability of referendum election outcomes?
• Preseparable extensions of multidimensional preferences
• Classifying interdependence in multidimensional binary preferences
• Permutations of separable preference orders
• Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences

Cited In (5)

• The mathematics of referendum elections and separable preferences
• Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• How does separability affect the desirability of referendum election outcomes?
• Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting

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