A procedural model of voting

DOI10.1007/BF00134152MaRDI QIDQ1193767zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sven Ove Hansson

Publication date 27 September 1992

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134152

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityconsensusstrategic votingvotingsocial choicedecisivenessanonymityneutralitymetapreferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Social choice with procedural preferences
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Cites work

• New operators for theory change
• Rights and the liberal paradoxes
• The choice axiom after twenty years
• The difference model of voting

Cited in

(10)

• Voting
• Preference-based choice functions: a generalized approach
• Why does voting get so complicated? A review of theories for analyzing democratic participation
• The Linear Voting Model
• Decision theoretic foundations for axioms of rational preference
• Constitutions, voting and democracy: a review
• A universal voting system based on the potential method
• The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections
• Social choice and individual values in the electronic republic
• Understanding voting behaviour in complex political systems

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