Cost-conscious voters in referendum elections

DOI10.2140/INVOLVE.2011.4.139zbMATH Open1230.91032OpenAlexW2136732407MaRDI QIDQ656035FDOQ656035

Authors: Jonathan K. Hodge, Lisa Moats, Kyle L. Golenbiewski 

Publication date: 26 January 2012

Published in: Involve (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://msp.berkeley.edu/involve/2011/4-2/p04.xhtml

Recommendations

• Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence
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• Voting paradoxes and referenda
• Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule

zbMATH Keywords

separabilityreferendum electionscost-consciousseparable preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (5)

• The mathematics of referendum elections and separable preferences
• Single-peaked preferences over multidimensional binary alternatives
• How does separability affect the desirability of referendum election outcomes?
• The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections
• On the separability of assembly preferences

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