Cost-conscious voters in referendum elections

DOI10.2140/INVOLVE.2011.4.139MaRDI QIDQ656035zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jonathan K. Hodge, Lisa Moats, Kyle L. Golenbiewski

Publication date 26 January 2012

Published in Involve (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://msp.berkeley.edu/involve/2011/4-2/p04.xhtml

zbMATH Keywords

separabilityreferendum electionscost-consciousseparable preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence
• Frugal bribery in voting
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• Strategic voting when participation is costly
• Strategic voting in repeated referenda
• An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
• Voting paradoxes and referenda
• Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule

Cited in

(5)

• How does separability affect the desirability of referendum election outcomes?
• Single-peaked preferences over multidimensional binary alternatives
• The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections
• The mathematics of referendum elections and separable preferences
• On the separability of assembly preferences

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