Rental harmony with roommates

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.06.006zbMATH Open1309.91079arXiv1406.6672OpenAlexW2090690038WikidataQ59567282 ScholiaQ59567282MaRDI QIDQ406385FDOQ406385

Authors: Yaron Azrieli, Eran Shmaya 

Publication date: 8 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We prove existence of envy-free allocations in markets with heterogenous indivisible goods and money, when a given quantity is supplied from each of the goods and agents have unit demands. We depart from most of the previous literature by allowing agents' preferences over the goods to depend on the entire vector of prices. Our proof uses Shapley's K-K-M-S theorem and Hall's marriage lemma. We then show how our theorem may be applied in two related problems: Existence of envy-free allocations in a version of the cake-cutting problem, and existence of equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisible goods and money.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.6672

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zbMATH Keywords

assignment problemenvy-freecake cuttingrental harmony

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Fixed-point and coincidence theorems (topological aspects) (54H25)

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Cited In (12)

• Fair and square: cake-cutting in two dimensions
• Equitable rent division on a soft budget
• KKM type theorems with boundary conditions
• Generalized rental harmony
• Room assignment-rent division: a market approach
• Competitive envy-free division
• How to cut a cake fairly: a generalization to groups
• Fully polynomial-time approximation schemes for fair rent division
• When dividing mixed manna is easier than dividing goods: competitive equilibria with a constant number of chores
• Envy-Free Division of Land
• Logarithmic algorithms for fair division problems
• Achieving rental harmony with a secretive roommate

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