Equitable rent division on a soft budget
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Publication:6160054
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.008zbMath1519.91141OpenAlexW4318833299MaRDI QIDQ6160054
Publication date: 23 June 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.008
market designno-envyalgorithmic game theorybudget constraintsquasi-linear preferencesequitable rent division
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)
Cites Work
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