Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability

DOI10.3982/TE1346zbMath1395.91263OpenAlexW1853642460WikidataQ59567294 ScholiaQ59567294MaRDI QIDQ4585991

Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1346

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessallocation rulesminimal manipulabilitybudge balance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (15)

Sharing an increase of the rent fairly ⋮ A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget ⋮ Divide and compromise ⋮ On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets ⋮ An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents ⋮ Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market ⋮ Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Equitable rent division on a soft budget ⋮ An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy ⋮ Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Manipulability in school choice ⋮ Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research ⋮ Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for Fair Rent Division

This page was built for publication: Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability