Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability

DOI10.3982/TE1346MaRDI QIDQ4585991zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers, Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te1346

zbMATH Keywords

allocation rulesbudge balancefairnessminimal manipulability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Efficiency and Budget Balance
• Budget-balancing incentive mechanisms
• A simple budget-balanced mechanism
• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
• Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
• Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority
• Proportional Budgeting and Decentralization
• Egalitarianism under earmark constraints
• Price of fairness in budget division for egalitarian social welfare
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 139609

Cited in

(22)

• Divide and compromise
• On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
• An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy
• Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
• Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
• A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget
• Manipulability in school choice
• Sharing an increase of the rent fairly
• Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
• Efficiency and Budget Balance
• An effective balanced budget and a d-nonmanipulable technique for processor time allocation
• Let them cheat!
• The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
• Fully polynomial-time approximation schemes for fair rent division
• An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
• Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
• Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences
• Equitable rent division on a soft budget
• Simple manipulations of Walrasian equilibrium rules in assignment problems
• Fair rent division: new budget and rent constraints
• Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money

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