How to cut a cake fairly: a generalization to groups

DOI10.1080/00029890.2021.1835338MaRDI QIDQ5144503zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong

Publication date 18 January 2021

Published in The American Mathematical Monthly (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.03327

zbMATH Keywords

group preferencesfair cake cutting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Abstract: A fundamental result in cake cutting states that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, there exists a division of the cake such that every player receives a single contiguous piece and no player is left envious. We generalize this result by showing that it is possible to partition the players into groups of any desired sizes and divide the cake among the groups, so that each group receives a single contiguous piece and no player finds the piece of another group better than that of the player's own group.

Recommendations

• Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited
• Extensions of cut-and-choose fair division
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2119670
• Two-player envy-free multi-cake division
• An approximation scheme for cake division with a linear number of cuts

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1234106 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1015852 (Why is no real title available?)
• Contiguous cake cutting: hardness results and approximation algorithms
• Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods
• Dividing a cake fairly
• Envy-free cake divisions cannot be found by finite protocols
• Fair cake-cutting among families
• How to Cut A Cake Fairly
• How to Cut a Cake Fairly
• Multilabeled Versions of Sperner's and Fan's Lemmas and Applications
• Rent division among groups
• Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division
• Rental harmony with roommates

Cited in

(4)

• Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited
• Consensus Halving for Sets of Items
• Approximate envy-freeness in graphical cake cutting
• Almost envy-freeness for groups: improved bounds via discrepancy theory

This page was built for publication: How to cut a cake fairly: a generalization to groups

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5144503)