How to cut a cake fairly: a generalization to groups
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Publication:5144503
DOI10.1080/00029890.2021.1835338zbMATH Open1455.91128arXiv2001.03327OpenAlexW3124854655MaRDI QIDQ5144503FDOQ5144503
Authors: Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Publication date: 18 January 2021
Published in: The American Mathematical Monthly (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: A fundamental result in cake cutting states that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, there exists a division of the cake such that every player receives a single contiguous piece and no player is left envious. We generalize this result by showing that it is possible to partition the players into groups of any desired sizes and divide the cake among the groups, so that each group receives a single contiguous piece and no player finds the piece of another group better than that of the player's own group.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.03327
Recommendations
Group preferences (91B10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cited In (4)
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