Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities
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Publication:999743
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.08.007zbMath1153.91366MaRDI QIDQ999743
Publication date: 10 February 2009
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.08.007
\(\mathcal G\)-strong core; generalized indivisible good allocation problem; preference revelation game; strict \(\mathcal G\)-proof Nash equilibrium
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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