Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2008.08.007zbMATH Open1153.91366OpenAlexW3124520286MaRDI QIDQ999743FDOQ999743

Authors Koji Takamiya

Publication date 10 February 2009

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.08.007

zbMATH Keywords

\(\mathcal G\)-strong coregeneralized indivisible good allocation problempreference revelation gamestrict \(\mathcal G\)-proof Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Games of manipulation in marriage problems
• On cores and indivisibility
• On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: a converse result
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(6)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784404 (Why is no real title available?)
• The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
• Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
• Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems

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