Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.08.007zbMath1153.91366MaRDI QIDQ999743

Koji Takamiya

Publication date: 10 February 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.08.007

zbMATH Keywords

\(\mathcal G\)-strong core; generalized indivisible good allocation problem; preference revelation game; strict \(\mathcal G\)-proof Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

Related Items

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Cites Work

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