Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
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Publication:1757579
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.008zbMath1419.91037OpenAlexW1521704848WikidataQ129982461 ScholiaQ129982461MaRDI QIDQ1757579
Publication date: 15 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.008
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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