Incentive Compatible Behavior in Core-Selecting Organizations

DOI10.2307/1913953zbMATH Open0388.90007OpenAlexW2062870026MaRDI QIDQ4170488FDOQ4170488

Authors: John O. Ledyard 

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913953

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cited In (6)

• Strategy-proof coalition formation
• Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
• Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
• Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
• Repeated implementation
• Implementation under ambiguity

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