Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.04.008MaRDI QIDQ1757579zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Lars Ehlers

Publication date 15 January 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.008

zbMATH Keywords

externalitiesgeneral allocation problemsIR-corestrategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
• Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Incentive Compatible Behavior in Core-Selecting Organizations
• Kidney Exchange
• Nonmanipulable Cores
• On cores and indivisibility
• On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: a converse result
• Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
• Strategy-proof coalition formation
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(12)

• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
• On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: a converse result
• Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
• Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• The Value 1 Problem Under Finite-memory Strategies for Concurrent Mean-payoff Games
• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Notes on marriage markets with weak externalities
• Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
• Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers
• Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities

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