Incentive Compatible Behavior in Core-Selecting Organizations

DOI10.2307/1913953MaRDI QIDQ4170488zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John O. Ledyard

Publication date 1977

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1913953

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cited in

(7)

• Repeated implementation
• Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
• Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
• Implementation under ambiguity
• Strategy-proof coalition formation
• Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers
• Unique stability in simple coalition formation games

This page was built for publication: Incentive Compatible Behavior in Core-Selecting Organizations

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4170488)