Kidney Exchange
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- If you are offered the right of first refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- Incentivizing resilience in financial networks
- Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
- Mathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists
- Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchings
- School choice with vouchers
- How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange
- Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- The kidney exchange problem: how hard is it to find a donor?
- Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
- Circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant
- Size versus truncation robustness in the assignment problem
- Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values
- Organ donation with vouchers
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
- Matching supply and demand in a sharing economy: classification, computational complexity, and application
- Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
- Efficiency in lung transplant allocation strategies
- Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants
- Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program
- Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm
- Matching with ownership
- A theoretical and computational equilibria analysis of a multi-player kidney exchange program
- Bipartite choices
- Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
- On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
- Parameterized approximations for the two-sided assortment optimization
- Primary versus secondary infrastructure capacity allocation mechanisms
- E-platooning: optimizing platoon formation for long-haul transportation with electric commercial vehicles
- Stochastic packing integer programs with few queries
- The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
- Stable fractional matchings
- A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
- Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Obvious manipulations
- Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
- The good Samaritan
- Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
- An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
- An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism
- Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
- Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs
- New insights on integer-programming models for the kidney exchange problem
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
- ReGale: some memorable results
- Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers
- The housing problem and revealed preference theory: duality and an application
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
- Kidney exchange: further utilization of donors via listed exchange
- A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
- Randomized parameterized algorithms for the kidney exchange problem
- Improved instance generation for kidney exchange programmes
- House-swapping with divorcing and engaged pairs
- Approximation algorithms for stochastic combinatorial optimization problems
- Decision making in kidney paired donation programs with altruistic donors
- Computing the Deficiency of Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses
- Optimal control of a paired-kidney exchange program
- An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Dynamic kidney exchange
- Maximising expectation of the number of transplants in kidney exchange programmes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5697111 (Why is no real title available?)
- Size Versus Stability in the Marriage Problem
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange
- Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
- Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
- Dual-donor organ exchange
- Kidney exchange programs with a priori crossmatch probing
- Tissue Matching and Matchability in Kidney Transplation
- An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A nonasymptotic approach to analyzing kidney exchange graphs
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
- Efficient and incentive-compatible liver exchange
- Algorithms for kidney donation
- Placement optimization in refugee resettlement
- Recourse in Kidney Exchange Programs
- On matching and thickness in heterogeneous dynamic markets
- Ignorance is almost bliss: near-optimal stochastic matching with few queries
- Market Design
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Maximum weight cycle packing in directed graphs, with application to kidney exchange programs
- House exchange and residential segregation in networks
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
- Fairness, efficiency, and flexibility in organ allocation for kidney transplantation
- Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism
- A dynamic model of barter exchange
- Pairwise kidney exchange over the blood group barrier
- Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
- Hardness results for stable exchange problems
- Hardness results for stable exchange problems
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Cycle selections
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
This page was built for publication: Kidney Exchange
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3159691)
