A dynamic model of barter exchange

DOI10.1137/1.9781611973730.129MaRDI QIDQ5363072zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ross Anderson, Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Yash Kanoria

Publication date 5 October 2017

Published in Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973730.129

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Random graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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Cited in

(22)

• Analysis of a dynamic, decentralized exchange economy
• A bounded-risk mechanism for the kidney exchange game
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• Parameterized approximations for the two-sided assortment optimization
• A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2088914 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Dynamic kidney exchange
• Randomized assignments for barter exchanges: fairness vs. efficiency
• Dynamics and comparative statics of Coleman's exchange model*
• Tropical vertex-disjoint cycles of a vertex-colored digraph: barter exchange with multiple items per agent
• Efficient dynamic barter exchange
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2087824 (Why is no real title available?)
• Matching while learning
• Min-cost bipartite perfect matching with delays
• Ignorance is almost bliss: near-optimal stochastic matching with few queries
• Dynamically stable matching
• Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets
• Stability in repeated matching markets
• Quick or cheap? Breaking points in dynamic markets
• Achieving the maximum size for exchange problems with dichotomous preferences
• On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets

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