Randomized assignments for barter exchanges: fairness vs. efficiency

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_32MaRDI QIDQ3449556zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wenyi Fang, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo

Publication date 4 November 2015

Published in Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:6ee83ebf-4b33-47cd-9ee5-47fd492d8682

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04) Matching models (91B68)

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(4)

• Linearized formulations for failure aware barter exchange
• Randomized parameterized algorithms for the kidney exchange problem
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6494101 (Why is no real title available?)

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