Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00246-7MaRDI QIDQ2059097zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rasoul Ramezanian, Mehdi Feizi

Publication date 13 December 2021

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00246-7

zbMATH Keywords

ex-post favoring ranksfavoring higher ranksinterim favoring ranksrandom assignment problemrobust ex-post favoring ranks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Fair solutions to the random assignment problem
• Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
• Individual sense of fairness: an experimental study
• New axioms for immediate acceptance
• Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• The modified Boston mechanism

Cited in

(9)

• Towards a fair distribution mechanism for asylum
• Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results
• Randomized assignments for barter exchanges: fairness vs. efficiency
• Ranking with Fairness Constraints
• Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms
• The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks
• The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization
• Characterizing a probabilistic version of the Boston mechanism under weak priorities
• Egalitarian random assignment

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