The object allocation problem with random priorities

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.03.010MaRDI QIDQ1651226zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date 12 July 2018

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

claimwise stabilityconstrained probabilistic serial mechanismconstrained sd-efficiencyprobabilistic deferred acceptance mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(29)

• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
• Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem
• Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
• The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
• Constrained random matching
• Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities
• Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
• Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
• Optimal priority assignment with hard constraint
• Approximate random allocation mechanisms
• Optimization-based mechanisms for the course allocation problem
• The complexity of computing the random priority allocation matrix
• Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3920196 (Why is no real title available?)
• Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 610251 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning matters: reappraising object allocation rules when agents strategically investigate
• Allocation with weak priorities and general constraints
• Random serial dictatorship: the one and only
• The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks
• Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism
• Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
• On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
• A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
• Characterizing a probabilistic version of the Boston mechanism under weak priorities
• Impossibility results for weak strategy-proofness and respect for improvements in random assignment with priorities
• Ex-post stability under two-sided matching: complexity and characterization

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