Random serial dictatorship: the one and only

DOI10.1287/MOOR.2019.0987MaRDI QIDQ5108269zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sophie Bade

Publication date 30 April 2020

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.0987

zbMATH Keywords

core from random endowmentsGale's top trading cyclesmatching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• The object allocation problem with random priorities
• Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
• Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
• Constrained random matching

Cites work

• A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• An Exact Analysis of Stable Allocation
• Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• Lotteries in student assignment: an equivalence result
• On cores and indivisibility
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The complexity of computing the random priority allocation matrix

Cited in

(25)

• Trading probabilities along cycles
• The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
• Constrained random matching
• On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
• Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
• Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
• Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
• Corrigendum to ``On randomized matching mechanisms [Econ. Theory 8 (1996) 377--381]
• A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
• Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality
• Random matching in the college admissions problem
• Menu mechanisms
• Efficiency of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one-sided matching
• Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
• Approximate efficiency in matching markets
• Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
• Top trading cycles
• Efficient matching under general constraints
• Rawlsian matching
• Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
• Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned
• Nonbossy mechanisms: mechanism design robust to secondary goals
• Decomposing random mechanisms

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