Top trading cycles
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Cites work
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- Consistency in house allocation problems
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3231692 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Kidney Exchange
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- My introduction to top-trading cycles
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- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
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- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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