Matching with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.12.004MaRDI QIDQ1729666zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Sophie Bade

Publication date 28 February 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

matchingsingle-peaked preferencesGale's top trading cyclesobvious strategyproofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
• An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
• Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• On cores and indivisibility
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects

Cited in

(14)

• Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
• Top trading cycles
• The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
• Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints
• On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions
• On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options
• Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
• Characterization of top trading cycles with single-dipped preferences
• A simple construction of complete single-peaked domains by recursive tiling
• Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
• Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
• Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences
• When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?
• Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle

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