Matching with single-peaked preferences
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Recommendations
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
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- Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets
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Cites work
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
- An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
Cited in
(14)- Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
- Top trading cycles
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
- Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints
- On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions
- On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options
- Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
- Characterization of top trading cycles with single-dipped preferences
- A simple construction of complete single-peaked domains by recursive tiling
- Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
- Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
- Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences
- When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?
- Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle
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