Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2100102
DOI10.1007/s00182-022-00803-6zbMath1505.91202OpenAlexW4220682782MaRDI QIDQ2100102
Publication date: 21 November 2022
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00803-6
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items
Cites Work
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
- Non-bossiness
- A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Matching with single-peaked preferences
- An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- On cores and indivisibility
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
This page was built for publication: Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
