An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2015.11.010zbMath1408.91019OpenAlexW2190622451MaRDI QIDQ1785480

Jay Sethuraman

Publication date: 28 September 2018

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.11.010

zbMATH Keywords

housing marketcore mechanismtop-trading cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (7)

The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked ⋮ Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets ⋮ Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof ⋮ On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model ⋮ Matching with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler

Cites Work

• A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• On cores and indivisibility
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores

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