An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2015.11.010MaRDI QIDQ1785480zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jay Sethuraman

Publication date 28 September 2018

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.11.010

zbMATH Keywords

core mechanismhousing markettop-trading cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
• Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies
• Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
• On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties
• A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule

Cites work

• A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• On cores and indivisibility
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities

Cited in

(14)

• Matching with single-peaked preferences
• A theoretical framework for the TTA algorithm
• Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
• The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
• On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
• Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
• Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
• Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof
• Top trading cycles
• Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
• Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods: a comment
• Some new characterizations of top trading cycles
• Characterizing TTC via endowments-swapping-proofness and truncation-proofness
• A characterization of the top-trading-cycles mechanism for housing markets via respecting-improvement

This page was built for publication: An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1785480)