Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof
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Publication:6117767
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111459OpenAlexW4388840731MaRDI QIDQ6117767
Publication date: 20 March 2024
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111459
Cites Work
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- On cores and indivisibility
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
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- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
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