Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111459OpenAlexW4388840731MaRDI QIDQ6117767

Jay Sethuraman, Özgün Ekici

Publication date: 20 March 2024

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111459

zbMATH Keywords

top trading cyclesstrategyproofindivisible objectindividually-rationalpair-efficient

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
• On cores and indivisibility
• Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources

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