Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle

DOI10.1613/jair.1.11732zbMath1452.91119OpenAlexW3037145273MaRDI QIDQ5114791

Dominik Peters, Martin Lackner

Publication date: 26 June 2020

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.jair.org/index.php/jair/article/download/11732/26591

zbMATH Keywords

social choice theorydomain of preferencessingle- and multi-winner voting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (11)

The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions ⋮ Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives ⋮ Group control for consent rules with consecutive qualifications ⋮ Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants ⋮ Structure of single-peaked preferences ⋮ Computing kemeny rankings from \(d\)-Euclidean preferences ⋮ Robustness among multiwinner voting rules ⋮ Recognizing single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary graph: complexity and algorithms ⋮ Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey ⋮ Preferences Single-Peaked on a Tree: Multiwinner Elections and Structural Results

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