On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1033-0zbMath1392.91026arXiv1505.05852OpenAlexW2122315855WikidataQ41878098 ScholiaQ41878098MaRDI QIDQ1704048

Martin Lackner, Marie-Louise Lackner

Publication date: 8 March 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.05852

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial analysissingle-peaked preferencesdomain restriction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (12)

The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions ⋮ Enhancing the connections between patterns in permutations and forbidden configurations in restricted elections ⋮ Combinatorics of Election Scores ⋮ Patterns in Shi tableaux and Dyck paths ⋮ Unified approach to fractional calculus images involving the pathway transform of extended \(k\)-gamma function and applications ⋮ Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting ⋮ Structure of single-peaked preferences ⋮ Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms ⋮ On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing narcissistic preference profiles ⋮ Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain ⋮ Small one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey

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