On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing narcissistic preference profiles
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Abstract: We investigate preference profiles for a set of voters, where each voter has a preference order on a finite set of alternatives (that is, a linear order on ) such that for each two alternatives , voter prefers to if . Such a profile is narcissistic if each alternative is preferred the most by at least one voter. It is single-peaked if there is a linear order on the alternatives such that each voter's preferences on the alternatives along the order are either strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing, or first strictly increasing and then strictly decreasing. It is single-crossing if there is a linear order on the voters such that each pair of alternatives divides the order into at most two suborders, where in each suborder, all voters have the same linear order on this pair. We show that for voters and alternatives,the number of single-peaked narcissistic profiles is while the number of single-crossing narcissistic profiles is .
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Cited in
(5)- Small one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles
- Structured preferences: a literature survey
- Enhancing the connections between patterns in permutations and forbidden configurations in restricted elections
- Structure of single-peaked preferences
- The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions
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