The one-dimensional Euclidean domain: finitely many obstructions are not enough

DOI10.1007/s00355-016-1011-yzbMath1392.91025arXiv1506.03838OpenAlexW618068981MaRDI QIDQ2397665

Jiehua Chen, Gerhard J. Woeginger, Kirk R. Pruhs

Publication date: 23 May 2017

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.03838

zbMATH Keywords

finitely many obstructionsone-dimensional Euclidean preference profile

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (9)

Enhancing the connections between patterns in permutations and forbidden configurations in restricted elections ⋮ Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby? ⋮ A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain ⋮ Multidimensional Manhattan preferences ⋮ On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences ⋮ On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing narcissistic preference profiles ⋮ On the parameterized complexity of party nominations ⋮ Small one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey

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