The one-dimensional Euclidean domain: finitely many obstructions are not enough
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Publication:2397665
DOI10.1007/S00355-016-1011-YzbMATH Open1392.91025arXiv1506.03838OpenAlexW618068981MaRDI QIDQ2397665FDOQ2397665
Authors: Jiehua Chen, Kirk Pruhs, Gerhard J. Woeginger 
Publication date: 23 May 2017
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We show that one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles can not be characterized in terms of finitely many forbidden substructures. This result is in strong contrast to the case of single-peaked and single-crossing preference profiles, for which such finite characterizations have been derived in the literature.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.03838
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