The one-dimensional Euclidean domain: finitely many obstructions are not enough

DOI10.1007/S00355-016-1011-YMaRDI QIDQ2397665zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jiehua Chen, Kirk Pruhs, Gerhard J. Woeginger

Publication date 23 May 2017

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.03838

zbMATH Keywords

finitely many obstructionsone-dimensional Euclidean preference profile

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Abstract: We show that one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles can not be characterized in terms of finitely many forbidden substructures. This result is in strong contrast to the case of single-peaked and single-crossing preference profiles, for which such finite characterizations have been derived in the literature.

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Cited in

(12)

• A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain
• On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
• On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing narcissistic preference profiles
• Recognizing one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles
• Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?
• Euclidean preferences
• Enhancing the connections between patterns in permutations and forbidden configurations in restricted elections
• Euclidean preferences in the plane under \(\ell_1,\ell_2\) and \(\ell_\infty\) norms
• Small one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles
• On the parameterized complexity of party nominations
• Multidimensional Manhattan preferences
• Structured preferences: a literature survey

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