Modeling single-peakedness for votes with ties

zbMATH Open1394.91125MaRDI QIDQ4583938FDOQ4583938

Authors Zack Fitzsimmons, Edith Hemaspaandra

Publication date 29 August 2018

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.08191

zbMATH Keywords

electionscomputational social choicesingle-peaked preferencesvotes with ties

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(5)

• Computational aspects of nearly single-peaked electorates
• Incomplete preferences in single-peaked electorates
• On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
• Measuring nearly single-peakedness of an electorate: some new insights
• The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control

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