The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
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Publication:490458
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1318518 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Unidimensional Unfolding Representations
- A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems
- A comparison of polynomial time reducibilities
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Average Case Complete Problems
- Bounded single-peaked width and proportional representation
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- Classes of bounded nondeterminism
- Cloning in elections: finding the possible winners
- Complete sets and closeness to complexity classes
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
- Generalized juntas and NP-hard sets
- How hard is bribery in elections?
- How hard is it to control an election?
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Incidence matrices and interval graphs
- Introduction to algorithms
- Isomorphism Testing for Graphs, Semigroups, and Finite Automata are Polynomially Equivalent Problems
- Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- Multimode control attacks on elections
- On reductions of NP sets to sparse sets
- Polynomial-Time Bounded Truth-Table Reducibility of NP Sets to Sparse Sets
- Refining Nondeterminism in Relativized Polynomial-Time Bounded Computations
- Search versus decision for election manipulation problems
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- Social choice and individual values
- Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
- Swap bribery
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Cited in
(26)- A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain
- The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions
- Parameterized complexity of voter control in multi-peaked elections
- The control complexity of \(r\)-Approval: from the single-peaked case to the general case
- On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
- On the complexity of bribery with distance restrictions
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary graph: complexity and algorithms
- Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?
- Testing a mixture model of single-peaked preferences
- Exact algorithms for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems
- How hard is safe bribery?
- Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- Modeling single-peakedness for votes with ties
- Single-peaked consistency for weak orders is easy
- Bypassing combinatorial protections: polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates
- Measuring nearly single-peakedness of an electorate: some new insights
- Combinatorial voter control in elections
- Computational aspects of nearly single-peaked electorates
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- On the complexity of constructive control under nearly single-peaked preferences
- Structured preferences: a literature survey
- Manipulation of k-Approval in Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates
- The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections
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