Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2182815 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems
- A comparison of polynomial time reducibilities
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Exact analysis of Dodgson elections
- Exact complexity of the winner problem for Young elections
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
- How hard is bribery in elections?
- How hard is it to control an election?
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- The complexity of Kemeny elections
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Cited in
(60)- Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems
- The possible winner with uncertain weights problem
- Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
- Parameterized complexity of voter control in multi-peaked elections
- Exploiting social influence to control elections based on positional scoring rules
- Algorithms for gerrymandering over graphs
- Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections
- The control complexity of \(r\)-Approval: from the single-peaked case to the general case
- The learnability of voting rules
- Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
- Often Harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
- Isomorphic Distances Among Elections
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis
- Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
- The possible winner problem with uncertain weights revisited
- Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard
- Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
- Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
- On the computational complexity of variants of combinatorial voter control in elections
- Complexity of shift bribery for iterative voting rules
- Manipulation complexity of same-system runoff elections
- Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control
- The complexity of priced control in elections
- Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach
- Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
- Prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery
- New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates
- The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
- Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- Solving hard control problems in voting systems via integer programming
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
- Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
- Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
- Binary linear programming solutions and non-approximability for control problems in voting systems
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- How hard is it to control an election?
- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
- Constraint-based electoral districting using a new compactness measure: an application to Portugal
- Priced gerrymandering
- Mixed integer programming with convex/concave constraints: fixed-parameter tractability and applications to multicovering and voting
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- How to tamper with a parliament: strategic campaigns in apportionment elections
- Combinatorial voter control in elections
- Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
- Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
- The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control
- The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections
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