Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1028907
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2007.01.005zbMath1168.91346MaRDI QIDQ1028907
Hemaspaandra, Lane A., Jörg Rothe, Edith Hemaspaandra
Publication date: 9 July 2009
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2007.01.005
computational complexity; multiagent systems; preference aggregation; Condorcet voting; approval voting; plurality voting; election systems; computational resistance; destructive control; vote suppression
68Q25: Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity
91B12: Voting theory
68T01: General topics in artificial intelligence
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