Complexity of shift bribery for iterative voting rules

DOI10.1007/S10472-022-09802-5MaRDI QIDQ2095550zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Cynthia Maushagen, Marc Neveling, Jörg Rothe, Ann-Kathrin Selker

Publication date 17 November 2022

Published in Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-022-09802-5

zbMATH Keywords

computational social choiceiterative voting rulesshift briberyvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Possible and necessary winner problems in iterative elections with multiple rules
• Complexity of shift bribery in committee elections
• Approximation and hardness of shift-bribery
• How hard is bribery in elections?
• Voting and bribing in single-exponential time

Cites work

• Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
• Barriers to manipulation in voting
• Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules
• Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
• Clustering to minimize the maximum intercluster distance
• Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
• Control and bribery in voting
• Determining possible and necessary winners given partial orders
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice
• How hard is bribery in elections?
• How hard is it to control an election?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 610968 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6928629 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2182815 (Why is no real title available?)
• Introduction to the theory of voting
• Large-scale election campaigns: combinatorial shift bribery
• Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• Swap bribery
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• Voting and bribing in single-exponential time
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
• Where are the hard manipulation problems?
• XSAT and NAE-SAT of linear CNF classes

Cited in

(5)

• Multivariate complexity analysis of Swap Bribery
• The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450032 (Why is no real title available?)
• How hard is safe bribery?
• Possible and necessary winner problems in iterative elections with multiple rules

This page was built for publication: Complexity of shift bribery for iterative voting rules

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2095550)