Control and bribery in voting
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Publication:5133010
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Cited in
(56)- On the complexity of bribery with distance restrictions
- Election control through social influence with unknown preferences
- Protecting elections by recounting ballots
- Margin of victory for tournament solutions
- Complexity of shift bribery for iterative voting rules
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- Exploiting social influence to control elections based on positional scoring rules
- The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections
- Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard
- Dark money in Congressional House elections
- Election control through social influence with voters' uncertainty
- Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
- Local distance constrained bribery in voting
- Distance restricted manipulation in voting
- Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
- Approximation and hardness of shift-bribery
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- Distributed monitoring of election winners
- Mixed integer programming with convex/concave constraints: fixed-parameter tractability and applications to multicovering and voting
- Parameterized complexity of voter control in multi-peaked elections
- Parameterized resiliency problems
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- Group control for consent rules with consecutive qualifications
- The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules
- Complexity of manipulative interference in participatory budgeting
- Multimode control attacks on elections
- On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-nets
- Complexity of manipulative actions when voting with ties
- How hard is bribery in elections?
- A Parameterized Perspective on Attacking and Defending Elections
- The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters
- Multi-winner Election Control via Social Influence
- Bribery and control in stable marriage
- Path-disruption games: bribery and a probabilistic model
- Weighted electoral control
- Network-based vertex dissolution
- The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6747925 (Why is no real title available?)
- Computational complexity characterization of protecting elections from bribery
- Computational complexity characterization of protecting elections from bribery
- How hard is safe bribery?
- Priced gerrymandering
- Pervasive domination
- The effect of iterativity on adversarial opinion forming
- Complexity of conformant election manipulation
- Collective decision making
- How to tamper with a parliament: strategic campaigns in apportionment elections
- Strategic candidacy equilibria for common voting rules
- On the parameterized complexity of controlling amendment and successive winners
- Manipulation with(out) money in matching market
- Complexity of candidate control for single nontransferable vote and bloc voting
- Reforming an unfair allocation by exchanging goods
- Search versus search for collapsing electoral control types
- Reforming an unfair allocation by exchanging goods
- Algorithms for gerrymandering over graphs
- NP-hardness of two edge cover generalizations with applications to control and bribery for approval voting
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