Control and Bribery in Voting
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5133010
DOI10.1017/cbo9781107446984.008zbMath1452.91125OpenAlexW2488722845MaRDI QIDQ5133010
Publication date: 12 November 2020
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446984.008
Related Items (38)
The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections ⋮ A Parameterized Perspective on Attacking and Defending Elections ⋮ The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters ⋮ Algorithms for gerrymandering over graphs ⋮ Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard ⋮ On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-nets ⋮ Election control through social influence with voters' uncertainty ⋮ Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules ⋮ Multi-winner Election Control via Social Influence ⋮ How hard is safe bribery? ⋮ NP-hardness of two edge cover generalizations with applications to control and bribery for approval voting ⋮ Priced gerrymandering ⋮ Group control for consent rules with consecutive qualifications ⋮ Pervasive domination ⋮ The effect of iterativity on adversarial opinion forming ⋮ The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules ⋮ Complexity of manipulative interference in participatory budgeting ⋮ On the complexity of bribery with distance restrictions ⋮ Local distance constrained bribery in voting ⋮ Distance restricted manipulation in voting ⋮ Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control ⋮ Approximation and hardness of shift-Bribery ⋮ Bribery and Control in Stable Marriage ⋮ Path-disruption games: bribery and a probabilistic model ⋮ The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections ⋮ Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis ⋮ Election control through social influence with unknown preferences ⋮ Distributed monitoring of election winners ⋮ Computational complexity characterization of protecting elections from bribery ⋮ Protecting elections by recounting ballots ⋮ Mixed integer programming with convex/concave constraints: fixed-parameter tractability and applications to multicovering and voting ⋮ Margin of victory for tournament solutions ⋮ Parameterized complexity of voter control in multi-peaked elections ⋮ Parameterized resiliency problems ⋮ Network-Based Vertex Dissolution ⋮ Complexity of shift bribery for iterative voting rules ⋮ Structural control in weighted voting games ⋮ Exploiting social influence to control elections based on positional scoring rules
This page was built for publication: Control and Bribery in Voting
