Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2238692
DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2021.103508OpenAlexW3154829614MaRDI QIDQ2238692FDOQ2238692
Authors: Marc Neveling, Jörg Rothe 
Publication date: 2 November 2021
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2021.103508
Recommendations
- Online voter control in sequential elections
- The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections
- The Last Voting Rule Is Home: Complexity of Control by Partition of Candidates or Voters in Maximin Elections
- Complexity of control by partitioning veto and maximin elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Minimizing makespan in a two-machine flow shop with delays and unit-time operations is NP-hard
- Why the Count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet
- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
- A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems
- A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
- Clustering to minimize the maximum intercluster distance
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: why ``pack and crack does not work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- False-name manipulation in weighted voting games is hard for probabilistic polynomial time
- Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- How hard is it to control an election?
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- Fair division of indivisible items
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- Bypassing combinatorial protections: polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates
- Cloning in elections: finding the possible winners
- Swap bribery
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- How hard is bribery in elections?
- Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
- Barriers to manipulation in voting
- Control and bribery in voting
- Weighted electoral control
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Mathematical Derivation of an Election System
- On the computation of fully proportional representation
- Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
- A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
- False-name manipulations in weighted voting games
- Complexity theory and cryptology. An introduction to cryptocomplexity.
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control
- Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems
- Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- Fair division under ordinal preferences: computing envy-free allocations of indivisible goods
- The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
- More natural models of electoral control by partition
- The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Dichotomy for pure scoring rules under manipulative electoral actions
- Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
- Introduction to the theory of voting
- Hedonic games
- Search versus Decision for Election Manipulation Problems
- Borda-induced hedonic games with friends, enemies, and neutral players
- Duplication monotonicity in the allocation of indivisible goods
Cited In (5)
- Online voter control in sequential elections
- A group decision-making and optimization method based on relative inverse number
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- The possible winner with uncertain weights problem
- The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections
This page was built for publication: Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2238692)
