Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
DOI10.1007/S10472-017-9565-7zbMATH Open1404.91082OpenAlexW2766698873MaRDI QIDQ722093FDOQ722093
Authors: Cynthia Maushagen, Jörg Rothe 
Publication date: 20 July 2018
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-017-9565-7
Recommendations
- Complexity of control by partitioning veto and maximin elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- More natural models of electoral control by partition
- The Last Voting Rule Is Home: Complexity of Control by Partition of Candidates or Voters in Maximin Elections
- Elections with few voters: candidate control can be easy
- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
Social choice (91B14) Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
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- Complexity of control by partitioning veto and maximin elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
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Cited In (9)
- Controlling the order of moves in voting by veto. I: Conditions for making the given decision
- An additional player in the voting by veto problem
- More natural models of electoral control by partition
- Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
- The Last Voting Rule Is Home: Complexity of Control by Partition of Candidates or Voters in Maximin Elections
- Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: towards a unified model
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Complexity of control by partitioning veto and maximin elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters
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