Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
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Recommendations
- Complexity of control by partitioning veto and maximin elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- More natural models of electoral control by partition
- The Last Voting Rule Is Home: Complexity of Control by Partition of Candidates or Voters in Maximin Elections
- Elections with few voters: candidate control can be easy
- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3888913 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2234775 (Why is no real title available?)
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Cloning in elections: finding the possible winners
- Complexity of control by partitioning veto and maximin elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- Complexity theory and cryptology. An introduction to cryptocomplexity.
- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- Dichotomy for pure scoring rules under manipulative electoral actions
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Elections with few voters: candidate control can be easy
- Fundamentals of parameterized complexity
- How hard is bribery in elections?
- How hard is it to control an election?
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- More natural models of electoral control by partition
- Multimode control attacks on elections
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control
- Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: why ``pack and crack does not work
- Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
- Search versus decision for election manipulation problems
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
- The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
- Weighted electoral control
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Cited in
(9)- Controlling the order of moves in voting by veto. I: Conditions for making the given decision
- An additional player in the voting by veto problem
- More natural models of electoral control by partition
- Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
- The Last Voting Rule Is Home: Complexity of Control by Partition of Candidates or Voters in Maximin Elections
- Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: towards a unified model
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Complexity of control by partitioning veto and maximin elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters
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