Dichotomy for pure scoring rules under manipulative electoral actions

DOI10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1071MaRDI QIDQ4576237zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Schnoor

Publication date 12 July 2018

Full work available at URL http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/ecai/ecai2016.html#HemaspaandraS16

zbMATH Keywords

scoring rulesdichotomyconstructive control by deleting votersmanipulative electoral actions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(9)

• Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
• Search versus Decision for Election Manipulation Problems
• Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
• The possible winner problem with uncertain weights revisited
• Arithmetic Expression Construction.
• Dichotomy for voting systems
• Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
• Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
• Complexity of conformant election manipulation

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