The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3637904 (Why is no real title available?)
- A simplified NP-complete satisfiability problem
- Choice and complexity
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- On effectively computable realizations of choice functions
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Voting Problem
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
- The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
- The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
- Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
- Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
- Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- A quantitative Gobbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
- Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
- On avoiding vote swapping
- Complexity of safe strategic voting
- Computer science and decision theory
- Where are the hard manipulation problems?
- Vote trading in public elections
- Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
- On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- Kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting
- Cloning in elections: finding the possible winners
- Choosing the best among peers
- Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
- Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
- Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control
- Computational complexity in the design of voting rules
- Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Barriers to manipulation in voting
- The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
- On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
- Manipulation complexity of same-system runoff elections
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control
- A note on the complexity of manipulating weighted Schulze voting
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- How hard is it to control an election?
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Bribery in voting with CP-nets
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- Solving hard control problems in voting systems via integer programming
- Binary linear programming solutions and non-approximability for control problems in voting systems
- How to allocate review tasks for robust ranking
- Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
- Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
- Frugal bribery in voting
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
- Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
- Popular ranking
- Social choice and computational complexity
- Financial Cryptography and Data Security
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1024093 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the complexity of bribery and manipulation in tournaments with uncertain information
- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
- Algorithms and Computation
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
- Search versus decision for election manipulation problems
- Election Manipulation 100
- Tennis manipulation: can we help Serena Williams win another tournament? Or can we control a knockout tournament with reasonable complexity?
- The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections
- Order restricted inference in Chronobiology
- Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting
- Search versus Decision for Election Manipulation Problems
- Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard
- Protecting elections by recounting ballots
- Algorithms for gerrymandering over graphs
- Computing with voting trees
- Complexity of shift bribery for iterative voting rules
- Complexity of conformant election manipulation
- Collective decision making
- Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
- Isomorphic Distances Among Elections
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1759396 (Why is no real title available?)
- Complexity of manipulation and bribery in premise-based judgment aggregation with simple formulas
- Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
- The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules
- Exact algorithms for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems
- Efficient and accurate inference for mixtures of Mallows models with Spearman distance
- Byzantine preferential voting
- Human centered processes and decision support systems
- Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
- Combining voting rules together
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450032 (Why is no real title available?)
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
- Distance restricted manipulation in voting
- A brief history of social choice and welfare theory
- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
- A new perspective on implementation by voting trees
- Local distance constrained bribery in voting
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