Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
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Publication:404772
DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0785-4zbMATH Open1297.91064DBLPjournals/scw/SlinkoW14arXiv1301.1420OpenAlexW2050533464WikidataQ61586175 ScholiaQ61586175MaRDI QIDQ404772FDOQ404772
Publication date: 4 September 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: There are many situations in which mis-coordinated strategic voting can leave strategic voters worse off than they would have been had they not tried to strategize. We analyse the simplest of such scenarios, in which the set of strategic voters all have the same sincere preferences and all cast the same strategic vote, while all other voters vote sincerely. Most mis-coordinations in this framework can be classified as instances of either strategic overshooting (too many voted strategically) or strategic undershooting (too few). If mis-coordination can result in strategic voters ending up worse off than they would have been had they all just voted sincerely, we call the relevant strategic vote unsafe. We show that under every onto and non-dictatorial social choice rule there exist circumstances where a voter has an incentive to cast a safe strategic vote. We extend the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem by proving that every onto and non-dictatorial social choice rule can be individually manipulated by a voter casting a safe strategic vote.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.1420
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Cited In (13)
- Strategic voting under the plurality rule without the common knowledge assumption
- \(|N|\) cheers for democracy
- Logics in Artificial Intelligence
- Obvious manipulability of voting rules
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
- How hard is safe bribery?
- On the safety of group manipulation
- Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
- Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
- Changes that cause changes
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Distance restricted manipulation in voting
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
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