How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
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Publication:2500745
DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0052-4zbMATH Open1132.91406DBLPjournals/scw/Slinko06OpenAlexW2066702336WikidataQ61586346 ScholiaQ61586346MaRDI QIDQ2500745FDOQ2500745
Authors: Arkadii Slinko 
Publication date: 18 August 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0052-4
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Cites Work
- Positionalist voting functions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
- How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
- Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
- The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
- Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies
- On probability models in voting theory
- Strategic Voting Without Collusion Under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules
- A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
- A note on asymptotical strategy-proofness
Cited In (10)
- The influence of large coalitions
- On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
- Coalition voting
- How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
- Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
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