How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election

DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0052-4MaRDI QIDQ2500745zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Arkadii Slinko

Publication date 18 August 2006

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0052-4

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionmanipulabilityimpartial anonymous culturesocial choice rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3577263 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
• A note on asymptotical strategy-proofness
• A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
• Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies
• How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
• On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
• On probability models in voting theory
• Positionalist voting functions
• Strategic Voting Without Collusion Under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule

Cited in

(10)

• The influence of large coalitions
• On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
• The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
• Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
• Coalition voting
• How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
• Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
• Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3891043 (Why is no real title available?)
• Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations

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