How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
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Publication:2500745
DOI10.1007/s00355-005-0052-4zbMath1132.91406OpenAlexW2066702336WikidataQ61586346 ScholiaQ61586346MaRDI QIDQ2500745
Publication date: 18 August 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0052-4
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