Strategic Voting Without Collusion Under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules

DOI10.2307/2296823zbMath0302.90003OpenAlexW2011066998MaRDI QIDQ4058785

Prasanta K. Pattanaik

Publication date: 1975

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2296823

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (10)

No minimally reasonable collective-choice process can be strategy-proof ⋮ Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations ⋮ Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions ⋮ How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election ⋮ Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules ⋮ Manipulation of social decision functions ⋮ Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control ⋮ Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule ⋮ A note on manipulability of large voting schemes ⋮ On strategy-proof social choice correspondences

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