Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
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Publication:734050
DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0351-7zbMATH Open1183.91051OpenAlexW2046003173MaRDI QIDQ734050FDOQ734050
Publication date: 19 October 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0351-7
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Cites Work
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Cited In (11)
- Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
- Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
- Sensitivity analyses and measurements for group decisions using weighted scoring rules
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
- Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
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