Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
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Publication:734050
DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0351-7zbMath1183.91051OpenAlexW2046003173MaRDI QIDQ734050
Publication date: 19 October 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0351-7
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