Multivalued decision rules and coalitional nonmanipulability. Two possibility theorems
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Publication:374843
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(83)90008-3zbMATH Open1273.91110OpenAlexW1501792755MaRDI QIDQ374843FDOQ374843
Authors: Taradas Bandyopadhyay 
Publication date: 24 October 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(83)90008-3
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Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- On Schwartz's rule
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules
- Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
- Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
Cited In (7)
- Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
- Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- Manipulation of nonimposed, nonoligarchic, nonbinary group decision rules
- Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
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