On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment
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Publication:733769
DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0309-9zbMATH Open1184.91090OpenAlexW2074305913MaRDI QIDQ733769FDOQ733769
Publication date: 19 October 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0309-9
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Cites Work
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Choice under complete uncertainty: Axiomatic characterizations of some decision rules
- An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set
- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
Cited In (11)
- Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
- Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- On two new social choice correspondences.
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
- Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
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