On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment
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Cites work
- An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set
- Choice under complete uncertainty: Axiomatic characterizations of some decision rules
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
Cited in
(13)- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
- Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
- Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
- Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
- On two new social choice correspondences.
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