On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0309-9MaRDI QIDQ733769zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez

Publication date 19 October 2009

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0309-9

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesssocial choice correspondencebidictatorialdictatorial

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set
• Choice under complete uncertainty: Axiomatic characterizations of some decision rules
• On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
• On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
• Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized

Cited in

(13)

• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
• On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
• The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
• On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
• A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives
• On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
• Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
• Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
• Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
• Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
• Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
• On two new social choice correspondences.

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