Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.08.001zbMath1155.91348OpenAlexW2015354129MaRDI QIDQ1005762

Shin Sato

Publication date: 10 March 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesssocial choice functionexogenous indifference class

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model ⋮ Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets ⋮ Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods ⋮ Automated reasoning in social choice theory: some remarks

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Dictatorial domains
• Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
• On cores and indivisibility
• Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange

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