On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
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Cites work
- A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set
- A Strategic Analysis of Nonranked Voting Systems
- An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set
- Choice under complete uncertainty: Axiomatic characterizations of some decision rules
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
- Strategic Voting Without Collusion Under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
Cited in
(26)- Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- On two new social choice correspondences.
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
- Oligarchy for social choice correspondences and strategy-proofness
- Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
- A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures
- On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
- On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives
- Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
- A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives
- Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
- Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
- Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment
- Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
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