On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
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Publication:1024775
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0285-5zbMath1163.91336OpenAlexW4251840127MaRDI QIDQ1024775
Publication date: 17 June 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-008-0304-1
Related Items (9)
The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models ⋮ On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness ⋮ On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions ⋮ Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures ⋮ Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment ⋮ Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
Cites Work
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- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Strategic Voting Without Collusion Under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- A Strategic Analysis of Nonranked Voting Systems
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